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MIXED AGENDAS AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION
OF BUSINESS: CAN WE CLEAN UP THE MESS?
Thomas M. Arnold *
Jerry L. Stevens **
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of regulation in the U.S. economy shows a cumula-
tive growth of government involvement in private enterprise that
has helped business at times and has been at odds with business
at other times.' The wavering views on how much regulation is
warranted change over time and cut across political and philo-
sophical ideologies.2 For example, in the first two years of Presi-
dent Barack Obama's administration there was a push for new
and large increases in regulation of healthcare and financial
markets along with intervention into public markets with mas-
sive spending to bailout automakers3 and financial institutions.
Now, in the second half of the Obama term we are seeing a call
* Thomas M. Arnold, Ph.D., CFA is an Associate Professor of Finance and the F. Car-
lyle Tiller Chair in Business at the E.C. Robins School of Business at the University of
Richmond.
** Jerry L. Stevens, Ph.D., CCM is a Professor of Finance in the E.C. Robins School of
Business at the University of Richmond.
1. Government regulation of business has a constitutional framework at both the
federal and state level. Mark C. Christie, Economic Regulation in the United States: The
Constitutional Framework, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 949, 959, 972-79 (2006).
2. For example, deregulation of business in the late nineteenth century led to Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt's trust busting in the Progressive Era from 1901 to 1909. John
Wyzalek, Government Regulation of Business, in 4 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 25,
26 (3d ed. 2003). Deregulation then became common in the "Roaring Twenties," followed
by aggressive regulation and intervention under President Franklin Roosevelt in the New
Deal period following the Great Depression. Id. at 27. Deregulation returned in the 1950s,
followed by increased regulation throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Id. Finally, a wave of
deregulation began in the 1980s along with an economic boom. Id.
3. Brady Dennis, President Obama Plans To Pitch Reform on Wall Street, WASH.
POST, Sept. 14, 2009, at Al.
4. Jim Puzzanghera & Janet Hook, Obama Presses for Showdown on Financial
Reform, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2010, at Al.
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for regulatory review with an eye on reducing regulatory burdens
on economic growth and job creation.'
The purpose of this article is first to navigate through various
perspectives on government regulation in an effort to develop a
reasonable and consistent view for regulatory proposals. Parts II
and III of this article provide a brief outline of our current regula-
tory environment and its evolution. Part IV presents arguments
for an efficient regulation of business by using market based reg-
ulation with a separation of efficiency and equity issues, where
feasible. Examples of this regulatory approach appear throughout
the article along with suggested reforms.
II. THE EVOLVING HISTORY OF BUSINESS REGULATION
IN THE U.S. ECONOMY
A. Colonial Period
Government regulation of business in the United States existed
well before the American Revolution. The British Parliament
passed laws, such as the Navigation Act of 1651, to regulate trade
both with the colonies and within the colonies.' While these acts
benefitted England, they were not enforced until 1764 when the
British Parliament decided to finance its war debts by imposing
revenue generating acts on the colonies.7 The Currency Act of
1764, the Stamp Act of 1765, and the Townshend Acts of 1767
were all designed to raise money by regulating the economic ac-
tivities of the colonies.' Freedom from excessive government regu-
5. In his State of the Union Address on January 18, 2011, President Obama ordered
a review of federal regulations with an eye toward getting rid of regulations that hurt job
creation and economic growth. 112 CONG. REC. H457, 460 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2011) (state-
ment of Pres. Barack Obama). In a Wall Street Journal opinion column, the President
noted that the review will help straighten out the current patchwork of overlapping rules
and allow more transparent cost-benefit analysis of regulation. Barack Obama, Op-Ed.,
Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2011, at A17.
6. An Act for Increase of Shipping and Encouragement of the Navigation of This Na-
tion, (1651) 11 ACTS & ORDS. INTERREGNUM 559, 559-62 (Eng.); see LAWRENCE A. HARPER,
THE ENGLISH NAVIGATION LAWS: A SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY EXPERIMENT IN SOCIAL
ENGINEERING, at ix-x (Octagon Books 1964) (1939).
7. Wyzalek, supra note 2, at 25.
8. Stamp Act, 1765, 5 Geo. 3, c. 12 (Eng.); Currency Act, 1764, 4 Geo. 3, c. 34 (Eng.);
Revenue Act, 1767, 7 Geo. 3, c. 46 (Eng.); see also GARY B. NASH, THE URBAN CRUCIBLE:
THE NORTHERN SEAPORTS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 162 (1986);
Wyzalek, supra note 2, at 25.
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lation played a significant role in the American Revolution, but
replacement of the British Parliament by the Articles of Confede-
ration soon made it clear that responsive and effective regulation
of commerce was both necessary and controversial.'
B. Regulation in the Nineteenth Century-Building the Economy
At the start of the nineteenth century the federal government
promoted business by backing a uniform national currency, secur-
ing the legal status of contracts and private property, creating ta-
riff policies, providing a system of due process of law, providing
national defense, and making land gifts."o States also "actively
began to promote business."" Incorporation was relatively easy
and state courts gave corporations the benefit of limited liabili-
ty.12 "With its 1824 decision in Gibbons v. Ogden, the Supreme
Court strengthened the federal government's power to regulate
interstate [bly giving Congress the sole authority to regulate in-
terstate transportation."1 3 This landmark case cleared the way for
a national transportation system that was critical to business de-
velopment.
9. ROBERT SINGH, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT & POLITICS 27 (2003) ("Without the pow-
er to regulate interstate commerce or to levy taxes the national government found itself
unable to provide for its citizens or pay its war debts."). Shay's Rebellion in 1786-1787 illu-
strated the inability of the Articles of Confederation to provide a government strong
enough to maintain an orderly society. Paul Finkelman, 'A Well Regulated Militia": The
Second Amendment in Historical Perspective, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 195, 195-96 (2000). In
general, Americans realized that stronger powers were needed to raise taxes, establish a
judicial system, empower executive agencies, and regulate commerce. Wyzalek, supra note
2, at 25-26. See generally Jack N. Rakove, The Collapse of the Articles of Confederation, in
AMERICAN FOUNDING: ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 225 (1988) (dis-
cussing the historical establishment of the Constitution in 1789).
10. Wyzalek, supra note 2, at 25-26.
11. Id.
12. Id. In Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the Supreme Court of the United States
limited the power of states to interfere with private charters, including those of commer-
cial enterprises. 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 518, 656-57, 659, 661-62, 666 (1819).
13. Wyzalek, supra note 2, at 26; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 196-97 (1824)
(holding that the power to regulate commerce is vested solely in Congress).
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1. Regulation as an Anticompetitive Tool
By 1860, business regulation was used more often to prevent
competition than to promote free markets." As travel from state
to state became easier, state regulations to protect the interests of
local businesses became common." State licensing laws protected
local businesses by preventing out-of-state doctors, lawyers, bar-
bers, and tradesmen from practicing across state lines.e Follow-
ing the Civil War, the federal government gained increased power
to regulate business based on the Commerce Clause and police
powers granted in the Constitution. In 1877, the Supreme Court
upheld the use of states' police power to regulate business in
Munn v. Illinois.1 7 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court often used
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike
down state laws regulating business.16 Due process with respect
to property required judicial review of the substance of law, which
decreased the effectiveness of state regulation of national busi-
ness. Business thrived in this new regulatory environment as the
United States became an industrial giant. The Interstate Com-
merce Act created the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC")
to regulate railroads and transportation." By the end of the nine-
teenth century, the ICC evolved into a protective regulatory agent
for railroads, promoting the growing power of big business.2 0
14. A classic example is the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission to pro-
tect railroads. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A
PERSONAL STATEMENT 194-97 (1980); RICHARD D. STONE, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE
COMMISSION AND THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY 5-7 (1991).
15. Wyzalek, supra note 2, at 26.
16. Id.
17. See 94 U.S. 113, 135 (1877).
18. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 63-64 (1905).
19. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, 383 (1887). The Act was
the first federal law to regulate private industry in the United States. See Paul Stephen
Dempsey, Rate Regulation and Antitrust Immunity in Transportation: The Genesis and
Evolution of this Endangered Species, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 335, 336 (1983).
20. STONE, supra note 14, at 8-9.
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2. Trusts and Holding Companies
Business entities concentrated wealth and power in the 1880s
through the creation of trusts.2 1 While there are arguments to
justify trusts on the basis of economies of scale and access to capi-
tal, the key purpose of a trust soon became limiting competition.2 2
Trusts were monopolies that prevented competition, extracted
monopoly rents, exploited labor, and controlled prices. 23 The suc-
cess of trusts and holding companies such as Standard Oil soon
led to a long list of trusts exercising monopoly power in product
markets under the protection of the legal trust structure. 24 The
Sherman Act of 1890 aimed to promote competition by breaking
up trusts. Initially, the law was not enforced effectively due to
decisions of the Supreme Court such as United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., in which the Court deemed the power of the federal
government to regulate interstate commerce an insufficient cause
for breaking up a trust.26
C. Business and Anti-Business Sentiment in the Twentieth
Century
1. Enforcing the Sherman Act-Creating Competitive Markets
One turning point in the history of regulation took place early
in the 1900s as the Progressive movement sought to use business
regulation as a mechanism for larger social reform. Progressives
helped elect Theodore Roosevelt as president in 1904.27 The agen-
21. HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN
AMERICAN TRADITION 71-76 (1954).
22. Id. at 71.
23. See id. at 147, 161.
24. Id. at 76, 78.
25. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (2006)). The Sherman Act of 1890 requires the United States federal gov-
ernment to investigate and prosecute trusts, companies, and organizations suspected of
violating the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 4. It was the first federal statute to limit cartels and mono-
polies and continues to form the basis for most antitrust litigation by the federal govern-
ment. THORELLI, supra note 21, at 166; Meredith E.B. Bell & Elena Laskin, Antitrust Vi-
olations, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 357, 382 (1999).
26. See 156 U.S. 1, 12, 16-17 (1895) (holding that manufacturing was not interstate
commerce).
27. See MICHAEL McGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870-1920, at 155-59, 169 (2003).
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da for regulation of business then clearly shifted to a position of
hostility toward big business.2 8 Following the Civil War, business
concentration through trusts and holding companies led to abuses
and excess that provided easy targets for regulation.2 9 Holding
companies were legalized structures in a number of states, in-
cluding New Jersey and Delaware."o The Supreme Court upheld
the authority of the Sherman Act in the breakup of the Northern
Securities Company in 1904.31 With this precedent, Standard Oil
and American Tobacco were dissolved in 1911 on the basis that
they placed unreasonable restraints on trade. 2
2. The Clayton Act-Controlling Anticompetitive Methods of
Competition
Victories under the Sherman Act were important in shaping
more competitive business structures, but less obvious restraints
of trade continued. In 1914, Congress passed the Clayton Act to
strengthen control over business practices and to prevent "unfair"
methods of competition.33 The Federal Trade Commission was
created to enforce the legislation.3 4 Now, regulations attacked an-
ticompetitive conditions due to either a concentrated market
structure or unfair practices.3 5 The notion of a free market meant
a regulated market where competitors were free of unfair practic-
es and disadvantages linked to market concentration.3 6 The con-
cept of "market failure" emerged as outcomes from unregulated
28. Id. at 153.
29. See THORELLI, supra note 21, at 161.
30. JAMES C. BONBRIGHT & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE HOLDING COMPANY: ITS PUBLIC
SIGNIFICANCE AND ITS REGULATION 56-57 (1932). Early holding companies had charters
granted by state legislatures that explicitly permitted controlling stock of other corpora-
tions. Id. Holding companies grew as some states like New Jersey, and later Delaware,
offered favorable tax treatment. Ajay K. Mehrotra, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Mate-
rialism, 83 IND. L.J. 881, 898, 905-06 (2008).
31. United States v. N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. 197, 357, 357-58 (1904).
32. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 45, 79 (1911); United States
v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 184, 187 (1911).
33. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-
27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2006)).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 21; Wyzalek, supra note 2, at 27.
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53.
36. Elbert L. Robertson, A Corrective Justice Theory of Antitrust Regulation, 49 CATH.
U. L. REV. 741, 752-53, 766 (2000).
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markets deviated from the ideal world of perfect competition and
full pricing of all production costs."
For every regulatory action there tends to be a market reac-
tion. Competition in the Sherman and Clayton Acts is generally
defined along a single line of business and a domestic market.38
Big business reacted to this regulatory environment by creating
conglomerates across business lines and industries without heavy
concentration in a single line of business.3 9 Conglomerates existed
before World War II, but they became increasingly popular dur-
ing the late 1950s and early 1960s as a means of growth that
would not elicit antitrust scrutiny.40 While there was some inter-
est in expanding antitrust laws to regulate conglomerates in the
late 1960s and 1970s, the trend toward conglomerates ended in
the 1980s and 1990s when large diverse firms became too com-
plex to manage effectively." While the view was not universal, the
law generally did not view big business as bad per se, as long as
product markets remained competitive and business practices
were fair.42 Still, elements of a bias against business remained in
effect in the tax laws, much as it does today. For example, the in-
37. Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 351, 351 (1958).
38. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797-98 (1946) (utilizing the
domestic market share of the corporation in a single industry to determine whether or not
a monopoly or conspiracy to monopolize the industry existed for purposes of proving a vi-
olation of the Sherman Act); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 573, 588 (1966)
(stating that there should be no differentiation between defining the competitive market
under § 7 of the Clayton Act and § 2 of the Sherman Act).
39. Carlos D. Ramirez, The Clayton Act, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE
75, 77 (2004); Wyzalek, supra note 2, at 27.
40. See Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation
of Willard Hurst's Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 165 (1999) (discussing the
use of vertically integrated conglomerates after the Civil War as a means of controlling
other corporations); John T. Miller, Jr., Conglomerates, Conglomerate Mergers and the
Federal Antitrust Laws, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 613, 614-15 (1970) (discussing the use of
conglomerates during the 1960s and 1970s to avoid antitrust scrutiny); William J. Ko-
lasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Address Before the
George Mason University Symposium: Conglomerate Mergers and Range Effects: It's a
Long Way from Chicago to Brussels (Nov. 9, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/speeches/9536.pdf (discussing the use of conglomerate mergers to avoid antitrust
scrutiny).
41. See Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empiri-
cal Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895, 905 (1992). In the late 1960s the Attorney General
took an aggressive approach to applying antitrust law to conglomerates. Antitrust: Scourge
of the Conglomerates, TIME, May 23, 1969, at 100. Today there is little interest in conglo-
merate mergers unless they represent a merger of potential competitors. See, e.g., United
States v. SBC Commc'ns Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2000).
42. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2006).
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terest paid to debt holders of a corporation is tax deductible,
while corporate income is taxed at a corporate rate4 4 and then
again at the shareholder's tax rate on dividends." This bias leads
to increased use of leverage, which makes markets riskier."
3. Social Issues Linked to Regulating Business
The regulation of business took another important turn at the
start of the twentieth century. The need to "protect the public"
became a prime justification for additional regulation of business
standards and practices.4 7 Social activists took a larger view of
business responsibilities to include public health and safety con-
cerns.48 The common phrase "buyer beware" was sufficient warn-
ing if the producer and consumer had equal and adequate infor-
mation.4 9 But, consumers seldom have adequate information to
protect themselves from many business practices. For example,
Upton Sinclair's book, The Jungle, exposed unsanitary conditions
in the meatpacking industry, arousing public support for greater
regulation of business practices.o The Pure Food and Drug Act of
1906 provided the legal structure for regulating product stan-
dards 1 and Congress continued to strengthen these regulations
over most of the twentieth century.52
Social activists had a harder time gaining regulation of child
labor and various forms of labor practices that were deemed un-
fair. The Supreme Court failed to support child labor laws passed
43. I.R.C. § 163 (2010).
44. I.R.C. § 11.
45. I.R.C. §§ 61, 301, 316.
46. See, e.g., David Leonhardt, Heading Off the Next Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Mar. 28, 2010, at 36, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/magazine
/28Reform-t.html.
47. See, e.g., Pure Food and Drug Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
48. See id.
49. See, e.g., Pine River Logging Co. v. United States, 186 U.S. 279, 293-94 (1902).
50. UPTON SINcLAIR, THE JUNGLE 39, 131-32 (1906). Upton Sinclair was part of a
famous "muckraking" group seeking social change during the early part of the twentieth
century. Erik Ugland, Demarcating the Right to Gather News: A Sequential Interpretation
of the First Amendment, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 113, 176 (2008).
51. Pure Food and Drug Act, ch. 3915.
52. E.g., Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (co-
dified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2006)); Wholesome Meat Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-
201, 81 Stat. 584 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 671 (2006)).
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by Congress from 1913 to 1935 on the grounds that direct controls
of state and local commerce were beyond the powers of Con-
gress. It was not until 1941 that the Supreme Court upheld the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which regulated child labor
and provided worker protection.
The progressive movement for increased regulation of business
and direct intervention in the economy gained momentum during
the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt.5 ' New Deal legisla-
tion was in part a reaction to the stock market crash of 1929 and
56the subsequent depression. Poor macroeconomic performance
was now added to the list of market failures, allowing another
opening for government intervention.5 ' New Deal legislation was
extensive, and court battles were inevitable as a new and larger
role of government pushed the boundaries of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. 8 Government regulation made important inroads in bank-
ing and securities markets, while expanded government pro-
grams and agencies sought to jump-start the economy through di-
direct spending."
53. See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936); Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 561-62 (1923); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251,
276-77 (1918). Thus, the Supreme Court was one of the major obstacles to wage-hour and
child-labor laws prior to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.
54. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 202, 212 (2006)); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 108, 125 (1941).
55. See Patrick M. Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the Court Has Indirectly
Effected a Shift in the Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REV. 689, 699-700 (2006).
56. Id. at 699.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (discussing the
validity of minimum wage laws for women); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (discussing the validity of wage and hours laws that ap-
plied to businesses engaged in intrastate commerce); see also BASIL ROUCH, THE HISTORY
OF THE NEW DEAL 1933-1938, at 192 (2d ed. 1980) (explaining how the Supreme Court
faced the task of determining the constitutionality of the new legislation); Achim Steiner,
Focusing on the Good or the Bad: What Can International Environmental Law Do To Acce-
lerate the Transition Towards a Green Economy?, 25 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 843, 848-49
(2010) (discussing the wide ranging series of programs created by New Deal legislation).
59. ROUCH, supra note 58, at 71, 83 . Some programs were declared unconstitutional
and others were repealed during World War II. See, e.g., Labor-Federal Security Appropri-
ation Act, ch. 475, 56 Stat. 562, 569 (1942) (repealing the Civil Service Corps during World
War II). The New Deal had two stages. The first stage in 1933 dealt with groups that
needed help to recover, such as banking, railroads, manufacturing, and farming. ROUCH,
supra note 58, at 57, 61-62, 65-68, 72. The second stage from 1934 through 1936 ad-
dressed larger social issues including promotion of labor unions, relief programs, the So-
cial Security Act, and fair labor standards. Id. at 156, 161.
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The role of government intervention in the economy expanded
to include the "spender of last resort" in the wake of the Great
Depression, and both political parties slowly accepted the view
that free markets were not self-correcting."o Nevertheless, the
forms of government intervention remained controversial. The
"tax and spend" approach to government intervention largely dis-
places private market investing and spending decisions in favor
of government spending decisions.6 1 Government spending, not
guided by relative prices and market signals, is designed to di-
rectly boost demand and creates a deficit as a byproduct.6 2 As a
result, resource allocation takes place outside market signals and
may not offer optimal job creation or growth.63 To finance the def-
icit, the government then competes with the private sector for
credit, crowding out private investment. As a practical matter,
there is also the concern that once a government program for
spending is created, it is difficult to reverse course when the
economy improves, ultimately leading to bigger and more ineffi-
cient government at the expense of the private sector.
Proponents of regulation tend to favor government intervention
for structural issues, arguing that the economy will not self-
correct due to fundamental market imbalances." A more market-
oriented form of macroeconomic intervention creates a climate for
private spending and investing to allocate resources efficiently to
the greatest needs.6 Rather than large and direct government
60. INT'L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK APRIL 2009: CRISIS AND
RECOVERY 126 (2009), available at www.imf.orglexternal/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/pdfltext.pdf.
It is reported that even Republican Richard Nixon once proclaimed that "we are all Keyne-
sians now." "We Are All Keynesians Now", TIME, Dec. 31, 1965, at 64.
61. Roger W. Spencer & William P. Yohe, The "Crowding Out" of Private Expenditures
by Fiscal Policy Actions, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis REV., Oct. 1970, at 12, 12-21, avail-
able at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/70/10/Expenditures_.Oct1970.pdf.
62. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ROBERT E. LITAN & CARL J. SCHRAMM, GOOD CAPITALISM,
BAD CAPITALISM, AND THE ECONOMICS OF GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 36-37 (2007).
63. See Benjamin A. Templin, The Government Shareholder: Regulating Public Own-
ership of Private Enterprise, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1127, 1163-64 (2010). According to "Key-
nesian theory," there is no strong automatic market mechanism to move output and em-
ployment toward full employment levels. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY
OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 25-26 (1936). This market failure can be ad-
dressed with increased government spending and/or lower tax policies to increase aggre-
gate demand, resulting in increasing economic activity and reducing unemployment and
deflation. Id. at 374-81.
64. Spencer & Yohe, supra note 61, at 13-14.
65. See Templin, supra note 63, at 1140.
66. Id. at 1149-50.
67. See Spencer & Yohe, supra note 61, at 15.
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spending, regulations use market incentives through lower taxes
and targeted spending to encourage investment consistent with a
market solution to poor macroeconomic performance.68
4. Growth of Government Agencies in Place of Judicial Review
The regulatory environment in the twentieth century evolved
in another important way. The costs of regulation, uncertainty of
regulation enforcement, and the time it takes to adjust to a regu-
latory change are all relevant to economic stability.6" The early
history of regulation introduced the cumbersome process of regu-
lation by passing federal or state acts, and waiting for subsequent
judicial interpretations, which might or might not enforce the
regulation." This approach was largely replaced by the use of
administrative orders issued by commissions.' A plethora of
commissions and boards were created at both the state and feder-
al levels to cover a wide range of business and labor activities.7 2
While there are exceptions, businesses prefer this change in the
regulatory process because commissions tend to be staffed by
people familiar with the needs of business." Nobel laureate econ-
omist George Stigler advanced a "capture theory of regulation"
where businesses seek regulation to limit competition and form
friendly relationships with regulators." Such regulation is not all
bad from a public perspective. Regulators often come with work
experience in the industries they regulate and understand the
problems faced by business." From a cost perspective, appear-
ances before a commission lead to a quicker resolution of prob-
68. VICTOR A. CANTO, DOUGLAS H. JOINES & ARTHUR B. LAFFER, FOUNDATIONS OF
SUPPLY-SIDE ECONOMICS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 267-70 (1983).
69. See, e.g., Sal lannuzzi, Politics Is Hurting Certainty, Which Is Hurting Hiring,
FORBES.COM (Sept. 13, 2010, 7:30 PM), http://www.fobes.com/2010/09/13/job-growth-
hiring-markets-economy-monster-worldwide_3.html.
70. See RICHARD H. K. VIETOR, CONTRIVED COMPETITION: REGULATION AND
DEREGULATION IN AMERICA 3 (1994); Wyzalek, supra note 2, at 27.
71. See MARC ALLEN EISNER, REGULATORY POLITICS IN TRANSITION 42-44 (2d ed.
2000) (discussing the benefits of and motivation for creating commissions to administer
regulations); Wyzalek, supra note 2, at 27.
72. See VIETOR, supra note 70, at 8-9, 16-17; Wyzalek, supra note 2, at 27.
73. EISNER, supra note 71, at 15-17; Wyzalek, supra note 2, at 27.
74. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SC., Spring 1971, at 3, 5-6, 9-13.
75. EISNER, supra note 71, at 15-16.
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lems with more attention to details than legal proceedings, which
are much slower and more costly."
5. Regulatory Excess Leads to Deregulation
Events in the 1970s increased government regulation and in-
tervention. A number of agencies were created to protect the pub-
lic, including the Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Consumer Protec-
tion Agency. 7 Inflationary pressures led to dramatic government
intervention into the private sector with a series of wage and
price controls during the Nixon administration that disrupted the
role competitive prices played in allocating resources.7 ' The cu-
mulative weight of business regulation along with a large federal
budget deficit prompted support for a different approach.7 ' Dere-
gulation became the mantra for proponents of a reduced role of
government in business and a return to more private market
based solutions."o By the end of the 1970s, the Civil Aeronautics
Board was abolished, followed by the ICC in 1995, and deregula-
tion took place in the airline, telecommunications, railroad, truck-
ing, television, and radio broadcasting industries."
6. Government Enters the Mortgage Market-Moral Hazard and
Unintended Consequences
While consumers and business benefitted from many of the re-
versals in business regulation, the failures of government regula-
tion and deregulation in the 1980s had a dramatic effect on the
76. Wyzalek, supra note 2, at 27.
77. EISNER, supra note 71, at 119.
78. Michael Mussa, Monetary Policy, in AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1980s 81,
86-87 (1994).
79. EISNER, supra note 71, at 177-79.
80. See Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, Deregulation and Regulatory Reform During
the1980s, in AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1980S, supra note 78, at 367, 371-72.
81. ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 701 note (2006)); Joskow & Noll, supra note 80, at 378-81 (dis-
cussing how the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 led to the dismantling of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board). Joskow and Noll note that many of the significant changes in economic
regulation began during the Carter administration and a deregulation movement should
not be confused with Reaganomics. Id. at 371.
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economy in 2007 and 2008.82 Deregulation of financial institu-
tions led to failures, especially in the savings and loan firms,
when interest rates spiked, and the declining values of long term
mortgages erased the equity in lender balance sheets." The inter-
est rate and credit risks of holding interest sensitive assets had
not been adequately managed. One response to this failure was
the creation of government sponsored secondary markets (e.g.,
Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, and Freddie Mac) with securitization of
mortgages into mortgage-backed securities." In 1995, Freddie
Mac began receiving affordable housing credit for buying sub-
prime securities." In 2004, Freddie Mac came under added pres-
sure from the Department of Housing and Urban Development to
increase its financing of low income housing, building a large base
of high risk "subprime" securities that were securitized and
spread throughout the financial system."
The combined effects of government sponsored agencies, at-
tempts to promote low income housing, easy money policies that
helped keep real estate prices rising, and mortgage securitization
82. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Debt Watchdogs: Tamed or Caught Napping?, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at Al (discussing deregulation in the context of credit-rating agen-
cies).
83. See Robert E. Litan, U.S Financial Markets and Institutions in the 1980s: A Dec-
ade of Turbulence, in AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1980S, supra note 78, at 519,
526-28. Financial institutions held short term interest sensitive assets. See id. at 526-27.
when interest rates increased, the mismatch in maturities resulted in declining values of
assets and a decline in equity. See id. at 526-28. Many financial institutions had no equity
when the balance sheet was market to market, leading to "zombie" banks and ultimate
failure. See id. at 535-36.
84. Id. at 542. As of 2008, Fannie Mae and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpora-
tion (Freddie Mac) owned or guaranteed 56.8% of the United State's $12 trillion mortgage
market. Charles Duhigg, Loan-Agency Woes Swell from a Trickle to a Torrent, N.Y. TIMES,
July 11, 2008, at Cl. In 1968 Fannie Mae split into a private corporation and a publicly
financed institution. DAVID H. CARPENTER & M. MAUREEN MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL 34657, FINANCIAL INSTITUTION INSOLVENCY: FEDERAL AUTHORITY OVER FANNIE
MAE, FREDDIE MAC, AND DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 2 (2008). The private corporation was
still called Fannie Mae, and the publicly financed institution was named the Government
National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae). Id. Only Ginnie Mae had an explicit insur-
ance policy to guarantee the value of mortgages. See Ken Belson, Finding a Refuge in Gin-
nie Mae Funds, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2010, at BU14. Congress then established Freddie
Mac through the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970. Emergency Home Finance Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 450 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1459
(2006)).
85. Carol D. Leonnig, How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed the Crisis, WASH. POST, June
20, 2008, at Al.
86. Id.
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created a serious moral hazard.17 The loan originator collected
fees and sold the mortgage, which was securitized with all of the
risks passed to the owner of the associated mortgage-backed se-
curity." The mortgage-backed securities were in turn reconfi-
gured into more complex structures such as collateralized debt
obligations ("CDO"s) with another transfer of the risk." Finally,
reinsurers entered into credit default swaps for these securities,
accepting the risk for a predetermined fee based on historical
mortgage default rates.o Oddly, current regulatory acts to ad-
dress the financial market problems revealed in the 2008 reces-
sion do not deal with the role of government sponsored agencies
or government induced moral hazards." The experience with gov-
ernment sponsored agencies and moral hazard illustrates the
danger of mixing economic intervention with a social agenda.
7. Sarbanes-Oxley-A Few Crooks Lead to High Compliance
Costs
The regulation of business gained a new impetus when the
2001 bankruptcy of Enron uncovered deceptive accounting prac-
tices and overstated earnings, which then resulted in an inflated
stock price.9 2 A number of other bankruptcies based on fraudulent
87. See Kevin Dowd, Moral Hazard and the Financial Crisis, 29 CATO J. 141, 142-43,
155 (2009), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj29nl/cj29nl-12.pdf. A moral
hazard creates a situation where a decision-maker has an incentive to do the wrong thing.
Id. at 142-43. In this case, the decision is to make high risk loans that would not have
been made if it were not for the ability to pass the risk through the secondary market to a
government security agency to then be securitized and passed on in the financial markets.
See id. at 143.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 146-47.
90. See Gretchen Morgenson, Arcane Market Is Next To Face Big Credit Test, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2008, at Al.
91. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). The
Act introduces wide ranging new regulations but fails to address the role government se-
curity agencies played in the great recession. See generally id. Just recently, the Obama
administration released a surprising housing finance policy report with a process to re-
place Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with three alternatives for conducting housing finance
policy. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., REFORMING
AMERICA'S HOUSING FINANCE MARKET: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 1-2, 11, 27-30 (2011).
92. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Enron's Legacy, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 221, 228-37 (2004)
(explaining the plethora of regulations introduced following the bankruptcy of Enron);
Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron, J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Spring
2003, at 3, 11-12 (discussing Enron's false accounting).
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accounting practices soon followed, leading to a general concern
for valuations based on reported data.93 Congress responded by
passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which emphasized greater over-
sight and assignment of legal responsibilities to all managers."
Compliance costs and red tape imposed on business in response to
Sarbanes-Oxley significantly increased the costs of regulation
over the last decade.95
III. THE POLITICS OF REGULATION-MIXED AGENDAS
A. Agency Theory Applied to Government-Perverse Incentives of
the Regulators
Regulation of private enterprise is the result of a political
process where the public elects representative agents to govern,
and the elected agents appoint heads of other government agen-
cies. Much like agency problems in corporations, where the man-
ager is not the owner, government also has inherent agency prob-
lems." The public has little control over the actions of elected
agents and virtually no control over the bureaucrats who are out-
side of the election process. There is no systematic alignment of
the incentive structures for government agents to achieve effi-
93. See Daniel Kadlek, Bernard Baumohl & Unmesh Kher, Under the Microscope,
TIME, Feb. 4, 2002, at 28-29 (discussing the financial world shaking post-Enron).
94. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
95. Floyd Norris, Top Regulator Says Sarbanes-Oxley Act Audits Are Too Costly and
Inefficient, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, at C4. A McKinsey & Company study commissioned
by New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and U.S. Senator Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.)
cites Sarbanes-Oxley as one reason America's financial sector is losing market share to
other financial centers worldwide. MCKINSEY & Co. & N.Y. ECON. DEV. CORP., SUSTAINING
NEW YORK'S AND THE U.S.' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 97 (2007). Recent
estimates of the costs of rules and restrictions on business reached $1.75 trillion. NICOLE
v. CRAIN & W. MARK CRAIN, SMALL Bus. ADMIN. OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, THE IMPACT OF
REGULATORY COSTS ON SMALL FIRMS, IV (2010), available at http://archive.sba.gov/advof
research/rs371tot.pdf.
96. Agency theory rests on the conflict of interest when one party has discretion in
making decisions on behalf of another party. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meck-
ling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3
J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). In the private sector, various mechanisms are used to align
the interests of the agent with those of the principal, including piece rates/commissions,
profit sharing, efficiency wages, the agent posting a bond, or fear of firing. Id.
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cient use of the public's resources. Either in anticipation of or as
a reaction to a regulation, a need is created for parallel bureau-
cracies of special interest groups organized to counter and influ-
ence government intervention. Businesses become as interested
in satisfying and influencing their regulators and lawmakers as
they are in producing and selling products and services. Lobbyists
play an important role in presenting views of special interest
groups, offering data, and providing funding for campaigns of
elected officials.98
B. Capture Theory in Action-Where Is Objective Market-Based
Regulation?
Capture theory predicts that appointed regulators will tend to
come from within the industry or special interest groups directly
related or sympathetic to what is to be regulated." For example,
prior to being the Secretary of Treasury, Henry Paulson was the
former chairman and chief executive officer of Goldman Sachs.'o
Paulson was a key figure in the design and direction of the gov-
ernment's rescue of the financial industry."o' Critics of the rescue
point to this conflicting interest with respect to recipients of gov-
ernment bailout money, such as Goldman Sachs.'02 On a different
front, Secretary of Labor Hilda L. Solis is a recognized leader of
environmental justice issues, with a background in the Office of
Hispanic Affairs during the Carter Administration, and as an
analyst with the Office of Management and Budget in the Civil
Rights Division.103 As a chairwoman of the California Senate In-
dustrial Relations Committee, she was a leader in the effort to
raise the state minimum wage from $4.25 to $5.75 an hour, while
the majority of economists argued that higher minimum wages
97. See Andr6 Hampton, Markets, Myths, and a Man on the Moon: Aiding and Abet-
ting America's Flight From Health Insurance, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 987, 988-94 (2000).
98. Lloyd Hiteshi Meyer, What is This "Lobbying" That We Are So Worried About?, 26
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 485, 486-87, 539-41 (2008).
99. Stigler, supra note 74, at 3-7.
100. Chris Isidore, Goldman's Chief To Take on Treasury, CNNMONEY.COM (May 30,
2006, 1:36 PM), http://money.cn.com/2006/BO/newsleconomy/snow_replacement.
101. Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., A Second Opinion?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, at A29.
102. See id.
103. Meet Secretary of Labor Hilda L. Solis, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/
sec/welcome.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
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result in higher unemployment.104 The background of Secretary
Solis is more in line with a social progressive than a labor market
economist.
C. Intended Versus Unintended Consequences of Regulation-
Will Things Be Better?
It is no surprise that the system does not follow a consistent
philosophical approach to regulation and often moves in waves
from regulation to deregulation. Even if regulations were crafted
consistently without special interests, the intended consequences
of government regulation are often dwarfed in importance by the
unintended consequences of moral hazard, the excessive cost of
red tape, fraud, and the need to replace one set of regulations
with another.
The Dodd-Frank Act now seeks to address perceived flaws in
the financial system with more regulatory constraints that will
have intended and unintended consequences that we can only
imagine."o' Like the Dodd-Frank Act, most regulations from our
political system tend to be a mixture of economic and social agen-
das, making it difficult to evaluate the costs and benefits of the
changes made to the allocation of resources, relative price distor-
tions, income redistribution, hiring equality, risks, and perfor-
mance of the economy. 106
104. Id.; see also Mark Kelman, Progressive Vacuums, 48 STAN. L. REV. 975, 981 (1996)
(reviewing MICHAEL J. PIORE, BEYOND INDIVIDUALISM (1995) ("Mainstream economists
are, with very few exceptions, quite hostile to minimum wage laws .... Framed narrowly,
the critique of such legislation is that it causes involuntary unemployment.").
105. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
106. See Martha T. McClusky, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers' Compensation
"Reform," 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 672 (1998). An example of mixing regulation with so-
cial fairness concerns is found in § 342 of the Dodd-Frank Act where twenty new offices
are created for Minority and Women Inclusion at the various regulatory agencies. Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 342, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5452 (West
2011). This section was proposed by Representative Maxine Waters as a means of correct-
ing racial and gender imbalances at Wall Street firms and subcontractors. Kevin Roose,
Seeking Guidance on Dodd-Frank's Diversity Clause, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2010, http://deal
book.nytimes.com/2010/1 1/1/seeking-income-on-dodd-franks-diversity-clause.
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IV. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND SOCIAL GOALS-MUSINGS ON
REFORMS
A. Neoclassical Economics-The Idealistic Benchmark
Neoclassical economics, largely based on Adam Smith, provides
the framework for the ideal free market economy and offers a
model for economic growth and employment."o' Competition re-
sults in efficient production and rapid innovation."0 ' A consumer
allocates income and savings based on relative prices to make op-
timal consumption choices so that the marginal utility per dollar
spent is equalized across all products consumed."o' Firms employ
resources up to the point where the marginal revenue product is
equalized for all inputs and only normal profits are achieved.1 o A
business is motivated to act in the best interest of its owners by
focusing on profit maximization, forcing efficient resource use,
and innovating without biases that detract from efficiency.11' In-
vestments are geared to balance risk and return and are general-
ly risk averse." 2
Without government intervention, a competitive market de-
termines what is to be produced, how it is to be produced, and to
whom the production will be distributed." 3 On this last point, at-
tempts to redistribute income for social purposes is a political is-
sue, but for optimal growth it should be achieved with lump sum
redistributions that do not distort market signals, incentives, and
economic growth. Equality of opportunity is consistent with the
107. See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., Mathuan & Co. 1930) (1776).
108. Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated Marketplace,
75 CALIF. L. REV. 1005, 1006 (1987).
109. Equilibrium of the Consumer, THE ICROECONOMICS.COM, http://www.themicro
economics.comlequilibrium of_theconsumer.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
110. MARK HIRSCHEY, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 185 (12th ed. 2009) (explaining perfect
competition).
111. See Jon C. Sonstelie & Paul R. Portney, Profit Maximizing Communities and the
Theory of Local Public Expenditure, 5 J. URB. ECON. 263, 264 (1978).
112. R. Mark Williamson, Regulatory Theory and Deposit Insurance Reform, 42 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 105, 110 (1994).
113. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Market Failure and Regulatory Failure as Catalysts
for Political Change: The Choice Between Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect Competition,
46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1989) (discussing Adam Smith's market theory of eco-
nomics).
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free market paradigm," but equality of outcomes is a non-
market issue to be addressed in a political process."1 s
B. Market Failures, Public Goods, and Social Agendas
The U.S. economy often deviates from the ideal conditions of
Neoclassical economics, creating the potential for government
regulation to improve market outcomes."1 Regulation of business
can be divided into three primary categories: correction of market
failures, provision of public goods, and regulation to achieve non-
market social goals."1 7 Our view is that public goods and market
failures represent broad classes of areas where government mar-
ket intervention, under the right conditions, can be structured to
approximate the desired results of free markets. Regulation
aimed at achieving social goals should be conducted with lump
sum transfers to minimize distortions to market pricing and re-
source allocation relationships. Unfortunately, this is not the ap-
proach of past or current regulatory initiatives."1
Isolation of regulatory issues in a single act allows the costs
and benefits of a given regulatory initiative to be debated without
mixed efficiency and equality issues, resulting in more transpa-
rent data and analysis. Lump sum distributions outside the mar-
ket system address issues of inequality, leaving market signals
for optimal resource allocation relatively unaffected. Public choice
114. See John Cirace, A Synthesis of Law and Economics, 44 Sw. L.J. 1139, 1164 (1990)
(arguing maximum social wealth will be achieved if government action establishes equali-
ty of opportunity consistent with the efficiency of competitive markets); Harvey R. Miller,
Chapter 11, in Transition-From Boom to Bust and into the Future, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J.
375, 400 (2007) (defining the free market paradigm as the emergence of "economic growth
and prosperity" when the government stands aside and allows the markets to work).
115. Outcomes in a market process are conditioned by factors such as risk taking, ef-
fort, inherent skill, and the starting endowment of resources. The outcome is uncertain.
Guaranteed outcomes or entitlements may be in place outside the market system to create
a social welfare net for those who lose out in the market process. Dempsey, supra note
113, at 23, 30. Our goal is to allow societal choice for such safety net provisions without
distorting market incentives and relevant price signals for resource optimization.
116. See discussion supra Part W.A.
117. See discussion infra Part IV.C-F.
118. See Robert Hockett, What Kinds of Stock Ownership Plans Should There Be? Of
ESOPs, Other SOPs, and "Ownership Societies," 92 CORNELL L. REV. 865, 935-38 (2007)
(discussing how regulation intervention through the home and education finance pro-
grams distorted each respective market as well as the larger macroeconomy).
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is also improved by allowing separate analysis of the costs and
benefits of lump sum transfers. When there is a mixture of social
and economic efficiency objectives, it is difficult, if not impossible,
for the public to weigh the merits of each initiative, which leaves
too much unmonitored discretion to agents in government.
C. Correction of Market Failures
Business regulations designed to maintain competitive market
structure and business practices were first put in place with the
Sherman and Clayton Acts."' Overall, regulation to maintain the
competitive structure and behaviors of a Neoclassical model is
consistent with efficient regulation as long as the regulated out-
come improves efficiency of resource allocation.
More complex market failures occur when free market prices
do not reflect true costs and benefits, creating externalities. 12 0
Examples of externalities include the external costs of pollution,
smoking, or drinkingl21 and the external benefits of saving for re-
tirement.'22 The external costs and benefits of consumption or
production are not expressed in market prices, leading to under-
allocation of goods with positive externalities and overproduction
of goods with negative externalities.123 Here, the key public issue
is to objectively measure the extent of the externality and to fol-
low up with a market-based system to adjust prices.12 This ap-
proach is commonly known as internalizing the externality. 25 An
119. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(2006)); Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-
27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2006)); see also Part II.C.1-2.
120. See Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel, Transaction Costs, Externalities, and
"Two-Sided"Payment Markets, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 617, 622-23 (2005).
121. See id. at 622 (discussing the costs of "cleaning, healthcare, and a lower quality of
life" that pollution imposes on society).
122. Cf. Hampton, supra note 97, at 997, 999-1000 (defining a positive externality as
one in which a third party receives the benefit of a private party's consumption and pro-
viding healthcare as an example).
123. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1, 3-6 (1960).
124. See id. at 40-42; Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523,
1535 (1984).
125. The Coase Theorem illustrates that the socially optimal solution is to have the
cost of an externality paid through a bargaining process, without regard to who has the
legal responsibility for damages. Coase, supra note 123, at 4.
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example is the auction of pollution rights to set an efficient cost of
pollution for producers. 126 Obstacles to effective regulation of ex-
ternalities and adjustments of relative prices include a lack of
precision in the adjustment to relative prices, either directly or
with auctions of externality rights, and a mixture of efficiency
and equity arguments in the process. 127 Once special interest
groups and a host of unrelated compromises are added, the out-
come is not likely to approximate market efficiency. We deal with
reforms needed for these agency problems as part of our discus-
sion of public goods.
D. Market-Based Solutions for Credit Risk and "Too Big to Fail"
The Neoclassical economics framework applied to risk-return
tradeoffs demands that the probability of expected failure serves
as a deterrent to excessive risk. A series of high risk investments
increases the chance of losses and potential bankruptcy.128 Pur-
suit of the profit incentive is not a problem when all the conse-
quences of losses fall solely on the private decision maker. When
externalities from poor risk decisions occur, a deviation from the
ideal free market paradigm results.129 Excess risk taking is often
a function of agents making decisions for owners, government
bailout policies, and government agency activities that shift risk
taking from the private sector to the public sector.3 o
The "too big to fail" issue occurs when losses and the potential
failure of a firm impose serious consequences on the rest of the
economy.a 1 To avoid the external consequences of a firm's failure,
126. See Cooter, supra note 124, at 1535-36.
127. See Coase, supra note 123, at 41-42.
128. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Invest-
ment Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 301 (1991).
129. See The Risk Externality, ECONOMIST (Jan. 12, 2010, 6:11 PM), http://www.econ
omist.com/blogs/freeexchangec/2010/01/risk externality ("The larger a bank gets, the less
likely the government is to allow it to fail, and the more shielded it is from potential
losses. Size therefore generates some significant social costs, particularly since the nega-
tive externality encourages firms to take on too much risk.").
130. See 156 CONG. REc. S4034, 4038-39 (daily ed. May 20, 2010) (statement of Sen.
John Ensign).
131. See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Fi-
nancial Product Development, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1633 (2008).
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government bailouts of some fashion take place, and regulators
take over all or part of the private institution.'32 Risks are shifted
from the private sector to the government sector, and the taxpay-
er ultimately stands to make the payment.'33 Two common regu-
latory proposals for "too big to fail" problems include stricter reg-
ulation to steer well clear of bankruptcy and limiting the size of
firms to reduce the external costs of failure. 3 4 These solutions
impose costs on efficient resource allocation due to over-
capitalization, costs of regulation, and ultimate disruption of pri-
vate market resource allocation decisions. 35
When agents of the firm have taken on too much risk and
losses are pending, short run creditors pull out and leave only
owner equity to cushion the falling asset values." 6 Agents making
decisions on their own behalf, rather than for the best interest of
equity owners, may take these risks in exchange for the potential
of higher bonuses in riskier asset investments."' Even if no single
bank is too big, failures occur, and a sufficient number of failures
will have external costs prompting bailouts.' Even under higher
requirements, owner equity will be insufficient to absorb losses
resulting from the failure of a financial company that poses sys-
temic risk, and equity owners have limited monitoring control
over bank managers.
Expectations of government bailouts or government insurance
programs funded by premiums contribute to the moral hazard of
encouraging excessive risk taking. William Poole suggested a
132. See, e.g., The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), CENTER FOR FISCAL
ACCOUNTABILITY, http://www.fiscalaccountability.org/rusted-asset-relief-program-tarp-a
769 (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
133. See, e.g., David Wessel, Estimate of TARP's Cost to Taxpayers Increases, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 4, 2009, at A3.
134. See Bank Regulation, 28 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL'Y REP., Dec. 2009, at 21, 22.
135. 155 CONG. REC. H9875 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2009) (statement of Rep. Akin)
("Through experience, just history and common sense tells [sic] us that when the govern-
ment is trying to do something, there are some side effects. Sometimes it's expressively
expensive. Sometimes there is excessive bureaucracy and rationing, inefficient allocation
of resources, and degraded quality.").
136. Cory Dean Kandestin, Note, The Duty to Creditors in Near-Insolvent Firms: Eli-
minating the "Near-Insolvency" Distinction, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1235, 1244-46 (2007).
137. See, e.g., Robert C. Iig, Hedge Funds: The Missing Link in Executive Pay Reform,
28 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP., Sept. 2009, at 10.
138. See Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk-Management Failures at Finan-
cial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 114-16 (2010).
139. See id. at 114-20.
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market-based alternative form of regulation for this set of prob-
lems.'40 He proposed requiring financial institutions to hold sub-
stantial long term subordinate debt with staggered maturities in
the financial structure to provide a long term cushion for falling
asset values.141 The bond market would then offer an additional
monitor of the firm's risk profile, and higher yields would be re-
quired on the firm's subordinate debt if the firm were to take on
higher risk, offering an early warning device as well as imposing
higher costs of capital on the firm.142 Market discipline of excess
risk taking occurs as agents must account for the consequences of
higher risk profiles and increased costs of capital.14 3 The higher
costs of capital also serve to take the edge off expected returns
from risk, offering an automatic deterrent to excessive risk.'44
Additionally, agents are monitored because they must undergo
the scrutiny of the market when they make new issues of subor-
dinate securities to refinance subordinate debt that is coming
due. 145
Poole's approach to regulation is consistent with improved effi-
ciency and effective reduction of external costs in the private
market. It does not rely on the federal government to put added
constraints on free markets and offers a way to reduce moral ha-
zard by putting a buffer between excessive risk taking behavior
and reliance on public tax dollar support.
Many of the suggestions for financial market reform by the
current administration move in the wrong direction. Breaking up
financial institutions into smaller entities results in less competi-
tive firms in the international market and loses economies of
scale offered by size.'46 Ending proprietary trading activities of fi-
140. William Poole, Moral Hazard: The Long-Lasting Legacy of Bailouts, 65 FIN.
ANALYSTS J., Nov.[Dec. 2009, at 17, 21-23.
141. Id. at 22.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 22-23.
144. See id. at 22 (increasing the cost of capital by "eliminating the deductibility of in-
terest would reduce the risk of failure of large companies.").
145. Id.
146. Charles W. Calomiris, Op-Ed., In the World of Banks, Bigger Can Be Better, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 20, 2009, at A21. The 109 American banks with more than $10 billion of assets
paid an average annual interest rate of around 0.8% to their depositors, while the 7,651
smaller banks' interest rate was 1.2%. Rob Cox & Fiona Maharg Bravo, "Too Big to Fail"
Still Here to Stay, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2010, at B2. As regulations on banks mount, along
with the red tape already present under the Gramm-Leach-Bailey Act, the Patriot Act,
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nancial institutions misses the mark because financial market
externality costs were induced by holding risky real estate-linked
assets, not proprietary trading activities.1 47 In fact, the activities
of the bank are not the issue; rather, the issue is risk taking and
risk monitoring backed by sufficient private capital. Unless com-
pensation systems are regulated with an eye toward a better
alignment of agent and owner, it is not clear why any one seg-
ment of society's compensation should be regulated, outside of
envy or a sense of retribution.
E. Public Goods-Transparency and Agency Theory Remedies
Public goods represent a noted exception to the free market pa-
radigm. No market exists for a public good, and consumption of a
public good does not reduce the amount available to others.148
There are "free rider" problems with public goods that also pre-
vent private consumption, since it is not possible to exclude any-
one who does not pay for it.'49 Public goods are consumed by so-
ciety as a whole and are provided by the government.' Examples
include national defense, law enforcement, national parks, statis-
tics and information, homeland security, product safety stan-
dards, and environmental protection.' The challenge with public
goods is determining the correct amount of the good to provide
and implementing the most cost-effective way to produce the pub-
lic good.
The key problems with respect to public goods tend to be
asymmetric information and agency problems. The voting public,
scientific community, and agents of the government do not all
and the Bank Secrecy Act, smaller banks may find even bigger disadvantages in meeting
all the compliance costs. See id.
147. See Implications of the "Volcker Rules" for Financial Stability: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 11, 63-64 (2010) (statement of
Barry L. Zubrow, Executive Vice President and Chief Risk Officer, JPMorgan Chase and
Company). Ending proprietary trading for banks will limit their activities and reduce
overall profitability and diversification of business lines. To enhance profits banks will ei-
ther have to take more risk and/or find new ways to increase prices for their services.
148. See Renate Mayntz, Common Goods and Governance, in COMMON GOODS 15, 19
(Adrienne Hbritier ed., 2002).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id. (explaining that public goods are both non-rivalrous and non-excludable);
see also Peter Drahos, The Regulation of Public Goods, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 321, 321 (pro-
viding examples of public goods including "peace, order, and good government").
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have the same information for most public goods. For example,
military experts and intelligence agents may know more about
the key threats to national security and the best way to deal with
these threats. The relative costs and benefits of public goods are
not fully presented to the public, and many public good initiatives
are part of a more complex bundling of issues in government acts
and laws.152 Compromises, amendments, and multiple line items
in any given bill make it difficult to isolate cost and benefit data.
Agency problems occur as agents of the voting public are driven
by different agendas that often lead to bigger budgets than neces-
sary. "Pork barrel" politics is as much a matter of compromises to
satisfy the needs of agents and special interest groups as it is
about providing for the public good at the most efficient scale.153
Environmental protection provides a good example of a public
good where asymmetric information and agency theory make it
very difficult to define the optimal amount of the public good.154
Vested interests abound in the promotion of green technology in-
terests at the sake of more traditional technology. Even so, it is
very difficult to produce information and data that is objective
and subject to a cost-benefit analysis."5 s
F. Fighting Agency Problems-Transparency, Watchdogs, Term
Limits, and Re-Call
Government information, along with line item budgets, should
be more transparent, allowing less asymmetric information in the
public debate on both the optimal amount of a public good and its
efficient production. Incentives to deliver public goods at reason-
able costs need to be integrated in all levels of government deci-
sions. To help support this effort, public watchdog groups need to
be organized. These groups should have no particular affiliation
152. Jennifer Nou, Note, Regulating the Rulemakers: A Proposal for Deliberative Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 26 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 601, 604, 606-07 (2008).
153. See Virginia A. Fitt, Note, Honor at the Trough: The Ethics of Pork Politics, 25 J.L.
& POL. 467, 474 (2009).
154. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public
Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 559-63 (2001).
155. See id. at 561 (describing the problem of free-riders).
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to either a political or business agenda. The public needs to know
what public goods cost and that the budgets are kept in line with
market prices.
Agent voting and administrative actions should be guided by
cost-benefit data provided by public sources, not lobbyists. A ma-
jor obstacle is the need of agents to be re-elected with funding
from lobbyists and a need to provide "pork" (unrelated to meeting
the public good goal in the most cost-efficient manner) to local
voting constituents. Term limits and simple voter recall proce-
dures would be steps in the direction of breaking some of the
strings that pull agents away from the public interest. The infor-
mation asymmetry issue is more complex. On this front there is a
need for more independent and objective information and analy-
sis. Transparent line item budgets are needed without mixing leg-
islative issues in a given bill. For example, there should not be a
compromise on a new bridge project in exchange for the location
of a military base in a given area.
G. Social Goals-Dealing with Social Issues of Equity Outside the
Market System
Government regulations are often structured to achieve a social
agenda beyond correcting market failures or providing public
goods. The view that greater access to low income housing or stu-
dent loans are important social goals that prompted government
sponsored agencies like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae,
and Sallie Mae to enter the credit markets."' These interventions
in the credit allocation market occurred for social purposes.5"' We
saw the disaster in the mortgage market stem from the unin-
tended consequences of non-market driven credit allocation due
to the lack of market discipline in lending.' These issues have
not been addressed. Instead, the government is preoccupied with
tighter regulation of private financial markets."'
The criticism of the regulatory approach taken for social issues
should not be confused with a lack of empathy for the social
156. Leonnig, supra note 85.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
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goal."o If the public is supportive of subsidies for a given segment
of society, the solution is simply to follow a lump sum transfer
approach that does not distort market signals and efficiency. The
issue should be framed and presented to the public along with the
costs of the necessary or intended transfer. The gain in transpa-
rency and focus on the issue at hand improves public choice and
leaves credit allocation to the discipline of the market.
A list of examples where government regulation and direct in-
tervention distorts market outcomes to achieve a social goal is
lengthy, but a few examples of how we would separate social goal
regulation from lump sum transfers should suffice.
1. Minimum Wage Laws
A straightforward example is the use of minimum wage laws to
achieve a social goal of increasing income for low income workers.
There is little controversy among economists that these laws in-
crease unemployment and contribute to poorer economic perfor-
mance overall by setting an artificial price above the market equi-
librium price for labor."' Yet, the minimum wage laws remain
popular with the voting public seeking support for low income
workers.162 Our view is that wages and prices should not be set
for a social goal, since the disruption in markets leads to worse
performance due to a combination of lower production, higher
consumer prices, lower profit from investment, and higher unem-
ployment. Rather, if relief for low income workers is desired, the
government should make income transfers to low wage workers
to bypass labor market distortions. The social issue is presented
in a clearer fashion in this context, and the taxpaying public,
without a background in economics, has a better chance of eva-
luating costs and benefits.
160. Capitalism and altruism are not inconsistent, even in Neoclassical economics.
Adam Smith's "invisible hand" defense of capitalism was not without room for charity and
social goals. See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 318-19 (Knud Haa-
konssen ed., 2002).
161. See Kelman, supra note 104, at 981 & n.12.
162. Public Solidly Supports Increase in Minimum Wage, GALLUP (Jan. 4, 2006), http://
www.gallup.com/poll/20710/public-solidly-supports-increase-minimum-wage-aspx.
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2. Tariffs
A protective tariff is a tax on an imported good or service moti-
vated by a desire to subsidize domestic producers who are facing
stiff competition from imports.es Such tariffs enhance profits of
the domestic producer, but the domestic consumer pays a higher
price for a lower market clearing amount of the good or service,
resulting in deadweight loss to society.164 Retaliation by foreign
producers may occur, making all parties worse off in the process.
A better solution for all parties is simply to offer a lump sum sub-
sidy to protect industries, if that is the social goal.
3. Healthcare
Healthcare regulation has a massive set of provisions that are
beyond the scope of this article. But we address some of the more
salient issues as an example of how our view of regulation should
work in this context. Regulation to lower the costs of healthcare
and expand coverage is a worthy social goal. However, direct in-
tervention with non-market determined pricing of insurance
costs, pricing of healthcare services, and mandatory provisions for
coverage introduces a host of resource allocation issues, selection
bias problems, and moral hazards.' We would rather see more
targeted market solutions to increase the supply of services and
moderate the demand, resulting in lower market prices. For ex-
ample, the current healthcare legislation does not focus on ex-
panding the number of nurses, physician assistants, or doctors."'
Subsidies could be used to promote larger medical and nursing
163. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1593 (9th ed. 2009); see also LUDWIG VON MISES,
HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 361-62 (1998).
164. The term "deadweight loss" in economics refers to a condition where the market
equilibrium moves to a higher price at a lower market clearing quantity. The loss in wel-
fare is a net loss to society. Causes of deadweight losses include tariffs, binding price ceil-
ings or floors, taxes, and monopoly pricing. See VON MISES, supra note 163, at 361-62 (cit-
ing monopolistic pricing as a cause of deadweight loss); David Dudley, The Coase Theorem
as Applied to Trade Barriers and Optimal Adjustment Strategies, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 1029, 1036 (1998) (discussing how tariffs create deadweight loss).
165. See, e.g., J. Paul Singleton, Can You Really Have Too Much of a Good Thing?: How
Benevolent Tax Policies Have Attributed to the Explosion of Health Care Costs and How
New Policies Threaten To Do More of the Same, 8 DEPAuL BUS. & COM. L.J. 305, 321-29
(2010).
166. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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schools with attention to an expansion of preventive care practic-
es and low cost local treatment centers.
The demand for healthcare services might also be reduced with
lump sum expenditures to promote healthier diets and lifestyles.
Healthcare education in public schools can be improved to pro-
mote the social goal of long term health. Households can be given
access to online services to help deal with common healthcare
needs and offer answers to lifestyle and diet habits for good
health. A greater use of physician assistants should be encour-
aged to deal with most healthcare needs rather than using the
more expensive time of doctors. Preventable healthcare issues can
be minimized with subsidies for healthier life choices.
Cost of health insurance can be lowered by achieving the max-
imum number of exposures in the insurance pool, not allowing
someone to self select out until they need care. Private insurance
can be maintained, but a number of changes would help lower
premiums. For example, the pool needs to be as large as possible,
calling for elimination of restrictions on insurance across state
lines. Allowing more competition in insurance markets would be
an appropriate government response to bring insurance rates
down. Coverage of pre-existing conditions, which makes private
insurance premiums higher, can be achieved with a government
lump sum transfer based on the social notion that these illnesses
should be covered by the general public. If expanded coverage is a
social goal and insurance costs remain too high for a segment of
the economy with low income, a lump sum transfer would be ap-
propriate. Again, this approach would put the social choice in
perspective with transparent information for a public decision.
Other creative market approaches to health insurance are
needed to lower premiums and expand coverage. For example, a
national insurance market can be defined, and the rights to offer
a basic common plan can be auctioned to competing insurers.
These insurers would be much like a syndicate in investment
banking, where each party takes a prorated share of the total pool
to share risks. If the constitutionality of requiring everyone to
participate in the plan is achieved, this approach would make
sure both low risk exposures and high risk exposures are in the
pool, lowering expected costs. For example, young people do not
get insurance even though they are the lowest healthcare expo-
sures, making premiums higher for the insured exposures. This
approach allows competition and competitive pricing of health-
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care insurance while moving to a lower cost premium. Much of
what we have now in our healthcare regulation deludes voters in-
to thinking "someone else" will pay for expanded costs of coverage
and coverage of pre-existing conditions. A more transparent ac-
counting of costs and market pricing would help put these issues
in the correct perspective for public choice.
V. CONCLUSION
Government regulation of business is an evolving relationship
that has dual goals of making markets more competitive and effi-
cient by dealing with market failures, while also achieving a so-
cial agenda linked to equity concerns. Our review of the history of
regulation illustrates changing public attitudes toward regulation
with heavy influence of special interest groups on the final regu-
latory outcomes. Our political system makes it difficult to achieve
transparency in separating appropriate regulatory approaches to
specific market failures from non-market equity concerns. Agency
problems in both government and private enterprise complicate
the decision process leaving the public with little real under-
standing of the critical issues and likely consequences.
Government intervention along with a view that government
should be a backstop for poor individual decisions has generated
moral hazards that are capable of crippling the economy. Rather
than being a source of stability and certainty, government regula-
tion has often led to instability and uncertainty. A mixture of con-
flicting agendas in a lawmaking process, heavily influenced by
special interest groups, has left us with an incoherent regulatory
system where well-intended outcomes are often dwarfed by the
unintended consequences.
In this article we proposed a regulatory approach and a series
of changes in the way regulations are presented to the public for
support. Our intention is to clarify public choice by separating is-
sues of regulating market failure from issues of equity and social
change. Many of our suggestions are aimed at greater transpa-
rency in government along with better monitoring of agents work-
ing in government. An important point is that the intention of a
specific regulation must be articulated, and the proposed regula-
tion must be more directly targeted to achieving that intention,
without the distraction of other "add-on" issues that will be voted
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on at the same time. There needs to be tracking and accountabili-
ty for the regulatory decision along with monitoring of the gov-
ernment costs involved. We realize that this leaves room for fur-
ther discussion of a number of controversial issues, but the
discussion needs to be framed in terms of how well the regulatory
process achieves the stated objective without imposing other hid-
den costs on the public.

